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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1952 June, 1952 Number 3
THE EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES IN MISSOURI
HARRY W. KROEGERt
Thirty-seven years ago Professor Manley 0. Hudson, in a
penetrating commentary," analyzed the trend of Missouri de-
cisions on the rule against perpetuities and observed a marked
deviation by the Missouri courts from the principles developed
by the English courts and by the courts of other states upon the
question of the effect of a limitation void for remoteness upon
other limitations contained in the same deed or will which of
themselves were not too remote.
At the time of Professor Hudson's writing, Lockridge v. Mace2
and Shepperd v. Fisher3 had been decided. In each of these cases,
as we shall observe, a void limitation was held destructive of an
entire property disposition.
Later, Riley v. Jaeger4 evoked from the same writer the fol-
lowiiig comment:
One is led to ask whether in the future the existence of one
void remote limitation in a will is going to be held to be
sufficient to invalidate the whole will. Surely our law should
not be developed toward such a position. Yet, if as in Riley
v. Jaeger, wills are declared wholly void because of the appli-
cation of the rule against perpetuities to some of the limita-
tions, it will not be long until such an extreme position will
be contended for.5
t Member, SL Louis, Missouri Bar.
1. The Rule Against Perpetuities in Mis mli, 3 U. or Mo. BuLi. L. SE.
1 (1914).
2. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1-145 (1891).
3. 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907).
4. 189 S.W. 1168 (Mo. 1916).
5. Perpetuities-Effect of Rermoteahess, 14 U. oF Mo. But . L. Sm. 55(1917).
Washington University Open Scholarship
298 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Company" was yet to come.
There the court made the following statement, which epitomizes
the approach to the problem made in the earlier cases:
We have repeatedly held that where portions of a will are
void as being in contravention with the rule against per-
petuities, and as those portions relate to the same property
and constitute a part of a general plan of disposition, the
valid, as well as the invalid, portions will fall together.
[Lockridge v. Mace, 109 Mo. 162; Shepperd v. Fisher, 206
Mo. 208.]?
to which the reporter added the marginal note, "Entirely Void."
Do these decisions mean that whenever under the provisions
of a deed or will the vesting of title to the property disposed of
may be deferred for a period longer than twenty-one years (plus
periods of actual gestation) after a life or lives in being, the
entire property disposition is void, so that not only the limita-
tions 'void for remoteness, but also all prior and subsequent
limitations, not of themselves too remote, will fail?
The answer to that question remains, at this late date, a matter
of speculation. - , • -
It will suffice 'o observe at this point that there is a wide dis-
position among lawyers to conclude that in Missoui a limitation.
void for remoteness contaminates and renders void the entire
property disposition of which the void limitation is part. That
view is shared by that eminent authority on Missouri real prop-
erty law, Mr. McCune Gill.3 It has undoubted pragmatic force
because it is the governing principle for title examiners, under
whose -scrutiny fall property dispositions far more numerous
than those which come before the courts.
Froni an equitable standpoint, there is little to commend such
a concept of total invalidity.
Suppose that T, the father of three children, A, B, and C, by
his will were to make a gift of property to his daughter A for
life with remainder over upon the death of A to the then living
descendants of A per stirpes, provided that if any such descen-
dant should die before attaining the age of thirty years the share
of such descendant should go to his or her issue per stirpes or in
6. 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923).
17. Id. at 185, 249 S.W. at 639.
8. 1 TRIAT:sa 0N REAl. PnOPSRTY LAW IN MISSOURI 27 (1st ed. 1949).
Volume 2 contains, pp. 808-822, an invaluable digest of Missouri cases in-
volving the rule against perpetuities.
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default of such issue to the other descendants of A per stirpes.
The gifts of the life estate to A and of the remainders to A's
descendants, standing alone, would be valid, but the attempted
limitation over in the nature of an executory devise9 to take effect
upon the death of such a descendant before attaining the age of
thirty years would be void because it would not necessarily take
effect within a period of twenty-one years after a life or lives in
being at the time of T's death.
If the prophets of total voidity are correct in assuming that,
under the Missouri rule, any void limitation contaminates the
entire property disposition of which it is part-regardless of the
form of the void limitation and without judicial determination
that the testator would, had he been aware of the invalidity of
the limitation, have preferred that the balance of the disposition
fail-then, in the case above hypothesized, A's life estate would
not take effect and the remainder to A's descendants would not
take effect.
Such an interpretation of the rule against perpetuities would
expunge all that a testator willed with respect to his property
because he had willed more than the law allowed. To the extent
that such deletion is in disregard of the primary purposes of the
testator as disclosed by the will as a whole, it would render the
rule against perpetuities, not only an instrument to prevent sus-
pension of vestiture beyond the stipulated period, but also an in-
strument of retribution for attempted violation.
Rarely, in professional experience, is a lawyer called upon, at
his client's behest, to make testamentary provisions which flout
the rule against perpetuities. Rarely do ultimate limitations in
favor of unborn, and to the testator unknown, beneficiaries weigh
heavily in the testamentary plan. Almost universally they are
provisions which conform to the testator's general concept of
maintaining family succession, but which are waived without
regret upon the suggestion of illegality. Hence the penalty of
total destruction of a testamentary plan is one which falls most
usually upon the unwary and the ill-advised, whose plight and
that of the primary objects of their bounty should be of particular
concern to a court of equity.
9. As to the construction of such interests, see Deacon v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 271 Mo. 669, 691, 197 S.W. 261, 266 (1917) ; Sullivan v. Garesche
229 Mo. 496, 509, 129 S.W. 949, 953 (1910).
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THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF THE EFFECT OF VIOLATION
The rule against perpetuities was not in the beginning one of
retribution. It was a rule developed by the courts of England at
a comparatively late date to check the creation of successive in-
terests in property over an indefinite period of time through the
devices of shifting and springing uses and executory devises
which had been rendered possible by the Statute of Uses (1535)
and the Statute of Wills (1540). English conveyancers had
turned to those devices in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies in order to give effect to the desires of landowners to pass
property down to successive generations, because estates tail had,
despite the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus (1285), lost their
effectiveness for that purpose when the courts allowed them to
become barred by common recovery 10 and when subsequent
statutes rendered them destructible by fine or forfeiture. By
the procedures of common recovery and fine it had become possi-
ble for a tenant in tail to cut off not only his issue but also re-
mainders and reversionary interests.
When the courts in the sixteenth century were confronted
with the new devices of conditional limitations, which were not
destructible by common recovery or fine,1 there were immediate
rumblings of judicial discontent. But it was not until 1682 that
the Court of Chancery in the Duke of Norfolk's Case 2 developed
the doctrine that the validity of a contingent interest depended
upon its "distance in time."18
Yet neither in the Duke of Norfolk's Case, nor in that proces-
sion of cases 4 which established step by step the period allowed.
for the vesting of future interests, was there a holding or dis-
cernible contention that interests which became vested within the
allowed period would fall because of interests which were not to
vest within the allowed period. Indeed, it was the prior taker
10. Taltarum's Case, Y. B., Mich., 12 Edw. IV 19, pl. 25 (1472). See
GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 141 (4th ed. 1942); 2 PowErL,
REAL PROPERTY § 193 (1st ed. 1950). For a description of the procedure of
common recovery, see Ewing v. Nesbitt, 88 Ran. 708, 129 Pac. 1131 (1913).
11. See GRAY, op. cit. supra note 10, § 152 et seq.
12. 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
13. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 10, § 168.
14. Lloyd v. Carew, Show. P. C. 137, 1 Eng. Rep. 93 (1697); Jee v.
Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); Thelluson v. Woodford, 11
Ves. Jun. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805); Beard v. Westcott, 5 Taunt. 393,
128 Eng. Rep. 741 (1810) ; Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956(1833).
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who usually sought to have his estate enlarged. The rationale of
the early cases was implicit in the language of the bench and bar
which spoke, not of "void settlements," but of "void limitations."
Hence when the question of the effect of remote limitations upon
prior limitations came into issue, the general rule sustaining the
latter developed as a matter of course.'5
Broadly viewed, the courts in developing the rule against
perpetuities followed a path earlier trodden by the courts in the
development of the devices of barring entails-that of preventing
the creation of successive limited interests in property to take
effect over an indefinite period of time. That the rule bore a
definite relationship to the barring of entails by common recov-
ery and fine is clearly suggested by the cases.1
Such relationship might seem merely a matter of historical
interest, bearing only remotely upon the matter in hand, were it
not for the fact that in the prototype the effect of the recovery
or fine was to render the tenant in tail capable of conveying a fee
simple. The device of common recovery was an apotheosis of the
rights of the prior takers, and there is nothing in the origin or
development of the rule against perpetuities which suggests that
it was aimed at interests which were to take effect in proximity.
The prevailing American law follows the English law as to
the effect of void conditional limitations and executory devises,
and holds that where a conveyor 7 limits an estate in terms which
15. Doe d. Blesard v. Simpson, 3 Man. & G. 929, 133 Eng. Rep. 1414
(1842) ; Taylor v. Frobisher, 5 De. G. & Sm. 191, 64 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1852);
James v. Wynford (Lord), 1 Sm. & G. 40, 65 Eng. Rep. 18 (1852) ; Courtier
v. Oram, 21 Beav. 91, 52 Eng. Rep. 793 (1855); Webster v. Parr, 26 Beav.
236, 238, 53 Eng. Rep. 888 (1858); Hodgson v. Halford, 11 Ch. D. 959
(1879); Goodier v. Johnson, 18 Ch. D. 441, 446 (1881). It became settled
quite early, however, in England that a limitation subsequent to and ex-
pectant upon a limitation void under the rule against perpetuities was
likewise void, not from any infirmity in itself, but from the infirmity ex-
isting in the preceding limitation. Beard v. Wescott, 5 B. & Aid. 801, 106
Eng. Rep. 1383 (1822).
16. Long v. Blackall, 7 T. R. 100, 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 (1797); Cadell
v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). In comment a to § 374
of the Restatement of the Law of Property, it is stated that the period per-
missible under the rule against perpetuities corresponded roughly with the
period of tie-up normally caused by a type of settlement commonly current
in England at the time of the development of the rule, viz., a settlement by
A, upon the marriage of his son B, to B for life and thereafter to C, wife
of B, for life, followed by an estate tail in the children of the marriage, under
which two lives and a minority elapsed before a disentailing conveyance be-
came possible.
17. The use of the term "conveyor" is intended to conform to the usage
employed in the Restatement of the Law of Property and to include a
testator.
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if standing alone would create a valid fee and then attempts to
cut down the fee by a limitation in the nature of an executory
devise, which is void for remoteness, the fee takes effect divested
of the void limitation.1 This is the situation inherent in the
hypothetical case posed on page 298, supra.
Both English and American courts generally hold likewise that
where a conveyor limits estates upon alternative contingencies,
and upon the happening of one of the conditions the estate de-
pendent thereon must vest within the prescribed period, then if
that condition in fact occurs the limitation of that estate will be
given effect even though the limitation dependent upon the other
contingency would have been void for remotenes. 9 For example,
T creates by her will a trust for the life benefit of her daughter A,
with provision that if A dies leaving a child or children the prop-
erty shall be held for the benefit of such child or children and be
paid over to it or them upon the arrival of the youngest child
at the age of thirty years, or if A dies without leaving any chil-
dren or if all such children should die before arriving at the age
of thirty years, distribution is to be made to T's daughter B. If
A dies childless, the gift to B would take effect 20
In both the fee-executory devise situation and in the alterna-
tive contingencies situation it is apparent that the valid provisions
may be given effect without defeating the primary or dominant
purpose of the conveyor. Indeed it may be presumed, in the
absence of an expression of contrary intent, that had the con-
veyor known of the invalidity of the executory devise or of the
void alternative he would have preferred that the valid pro-
visions take effect.
18. Farnam v. Farnam, 83 Conn. 369, 77 Atl. 70 (1910); Nevitt v.
Woodburn, 190 Ill. 283, 60 N.E. 500 (1901); Chapman v. Cheney, 191 Il1.
574, 61 N.E. 363 (1901) ; Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. 142,
156 (1855); Bunting v. Hromas, 104 Neb. 383, 177 N.W. 190 (1920); Betts
v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941) ; Smith v. Townsend, 32 Pa. 434,
441 (1859); Saxton v. Webber, 83 Wis. 617, 53 N.W. 905 (1892); 2 RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 229 (1936); 2 PowEm, op. cit. supra note 10, § 306;
Note, 75 A.L.R. 127 (1931); Note, 28 A.L.R. 394 (1924).
19. Perkins v. Fisher, 59 Fed. 801 (4th Cir. 1894) ; Quinlan v. Wickman,
233 Ill. 39, 84 N.E. 38 (1908); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 53 Ky. (14 B.
Mon.) 333, 346 (1853); Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Ireland, 268
Mass. 62, 167 N.E. 261 (1929); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen)
539, 572 (1867); In re Trevor, 239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66 (1924); Crompe v.
Barrow, 4 Ves. Jun. 681, 31 Eng. Rep. 351 (1799); Vachel v. Vachel, 1 Cas.
Ch. 129, 130, 22 Eng. Rep. 727 (1669) ; Perpetuities § 59, 41 AM. JUs. 102
(1941) ; Note, 64 A.L.R. 1077 (1930).
20. CI. Quilan v. Wickman, 233 I1. 39, 84 N.E. 38 (1908).
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Void executory devises and void alternative contingencies do
not, however, make up the entire ambit of cases in which the rule
against perpetuities may be offended. The rule applies to all
types of future interests including remainders.
Obviously, where a void remainder is involved, there is a
greater degree of integration of such remainder with the balance
of the property disposition, and a more general statement of the
effect of the partial invalidity is required. No longer can the
problem be solved by the expedient of saying, as in the case of
the void executory devise, that the previously granted fee is
divested of the void limitation. No longer can it be taken for
granted that the conveyor, had he known of the partial invalidity,
would have sanctioned the balance of the property disposition.
Yet a liberal view of the effect of the partial invalidity has
emerged. It may be stated thus: Where by a property disposition
various estates are created, some of which are valid and others
of which are invalid, the valid ones will be given effect unless
they are so dependent upon the invalid provisions that they can-
not be separated therefrom without defeating the primary or,
dominant purpose of the deed or will.2
Sometimes the principle has been stated thus: If a limitation
in a will or deed violates the rule against perpetuities, the instru-
ment is to be read and given effect as if such limitation has been
stricken out, unless the invalid limitation is so essential to the
dispositive scheme that it may be inferred that the conveyor
would not have sanctioned the valid provisions without effect
being given to the void.u
In the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of
Property, the effect of invalid upon valid limitations is clearly
made to depend upon judicial ascertainment of the conveyor's
preference assuming that he had known of the partial invalidity.
Section 402 of the Restatement is as follows:
21. Shepard v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 106 Conn. 627, 138 AtL
809 (1927); Equitable Trust Co. v. Snader, 17 Del. Ch. 203, 151 AtI. 712
(Ch. 1930) ; Millikin Nat. Bank of Decatur v. Wilson, 343 I1. 55, 174 N.E.
857 (1931) ; Graham v. Whitridge, 99 Md. 248, 57 At). 609 (1904)'; Minot v.
Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918) ; In re Trevor, 239 N.Y. 6, 145
N.E. 66 (1924); in re Whitman's Estate, 248 Pa. 285, 93 AtI. 1062 (1915).
22. Cf. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638, 656
(1938).
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§ 402. PARTIAL INVALIDITY-EFFECT ON BAL-
ANCE OF ATTEMPTED DISPOSITION.
When part of an attempted disposition fails as a direct
consequence of the rule against perpetuities, the effect, if
any, of this partial invalidity upon the balance of the at-
tempted disposition is determined by judicially ascertaining
whether the conveyor, if he had known of this partial in-
validity, would have preferred that
(a) all the balance of the attempted disposition take
effect, in accordance with its terms; or that
(b) certain parts of the balance of the attempted dis-
position fail, but the rest thereof take effect in accordance
with its terms; or that
(c) all the balance of the attempted disposition fail.
The basic rationale of Section 402 is rendered clear by the
comments thereunder. Thus in Comment a "judicially ascer-
tained intent" of the conveyor is said to take into account "what-
ever the language or ciicumstances may reveal as to the con-
veyor's desires but rests chiefly upon judicially crystallized con-
clusions as to what a conveyor normally would have intended if
he had actually considered the possibility of the partial ineffec-
tiveness of his complete plan." And in Comment a also appears
the statement:
The dispositive planning of conveyors is thus given the
fullest possible effectiveness consistent with the social regu-
lation implicit in the rule against perpetuities.
That the constructional preference in a case of partial invalidity
is in favor of the sustension wherever possible of the interests
which are limited to vest within the allowed period is stated in
Comment c as follows:
c. Preferences as between Clauses (a)-(c): The construc-
tional preference stated in § 243 (c), for the 'legally more
effective construction' is a factor which causes most disputed
cases to be included within the rule of Clause (a) (see Com-
ment d). Sometimes the close connection between the invalid
part and some other part of the attempted disposition broad-
ens the resultant invalidity and thus makes applicable the
rule stated in Clause (b), (see Comments e and f). The
rule stated in Clause (c) is not applied unless either the close
connection between the invalid part and the balance of the
disposition requires this result or additional language or
circumstances are present which require an affirmative find-
ing of this intent on the part of the conveyor (see Comment
g).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/1
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Related sections of the Restatement set forth principles of
interpretation to be applied in determining whether limitations,
not of themselves too remote, are to be treated as being separable
from void limitations, or as being so subordinate to the void
limitations as to render it unreasonable to suppose that the con-
veyor would have wished the valid to stand without the invalid.
Such principles take into account the relationship of the donees
to the conveyor, the extent of the conveyor's property which is
involved and the degree of distortion in the dispositive plan
caused by the partial invalidity. Distortion between the stirpes
of the conveyor resulting from the invalidity of limitations in
favor of one or more of them would, for example, justify a find-
ing that the conveyor would have preferred failure of all of the
limitations to the class, had he known of the partial invalidity.
Such judicially developed conclusions as to what a conveyor nor-
mally would have preferred would, of course, yield to language
contained in the instrument, if there be such, from which an
actual preference may be inferred.
A study of the situations in which the interpretive principles
are applied is beyond the scope of this paper. It would not be
germane to this discussion, unless it appear that the construc-
tional preference, evident elsewhere, for the "fullest possible
effectiveness" in the face of partial invalidity resulting from the
rule against perpetuities obtains in MissourL
THE DECISIONS IN MISSOURI
Reverting now to the Missouri decisions on the effect of partial
invalidity, an analysis of the more important cases in their
chronological order seems preferable. No other approach would
seem to show as clearly the alternating currents of decision,
which at times supported the concept of resultant total invalid-
ity and at other times tended to flow in more traditional chan-
nels.
The story begins with Lockridge v. Mace23 in which a testator
devised land to his wife for life, then to his children for life and
then to his grandchildren for life, with remainder over to his
great-grandchildren in fee. The Missouri Supreme Court held
that the ultimate limitation to the great-grandchildren was void,
not only because it was susceptible of taking effect more than
23. 109 Mo. 162, 18 S.W. 1145 (1891).
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twenty-one years after a life or lives in being, but also because
it constituted a limitation to unborn children of unborn life
tenants,24 and that such invalidity destroyed the entire property
disposition. The life estates in the children and grandchildren
necessarily vested within the prescribed period, but the court
concluded that they failed because they were so bound up with
the disposition that fell beyond the prescribed period as to con-
stitute with it "but one disposition of the property." This test
constitutes a clear deviation from the test applied in other states, 2
and marks the starting point for the approach made by the
court in a number of subsequent cases. In practice it seems to
leave little room for the sustention in any case of prior valid
limitations, for almost any disposition of property providing for
a series of interests therein would in a broad sense constitute
"one .disposition of the property." Yet the court did not go so
far as to make a pronouncement that the effect of a void limita-
tion is total invalidity.
Shepperd v. Fishe4 6 involved a will in which the testator de-
vised certain real estate: to his widow for life; thereafter in
trust for the benefit of his daughter for life; thereafter to the
bodily heirs of the daughter "if the said bodily heirs have issue,
forever"; but if such bodily heirs should die without issue, then
by way of reversion to the testator's heirs. The limitation to the
bodily heirs was treated by the court as consisting of a gift of
life interests which were to be enlarged into fees should the
bodily heirs die leaving issue. According to such interpretation,
not only the life estates io the widow and to the daughter, but
also the life estates to the bodily heirs of the daughter, were
limited to vest within the period allowed by the rule against
perpetuities and not of themselves invalid. It is suggested that
under the language of the will the limitation to the bodily heirs
might have been treated as a limitation of remainders in fee to
vest within the allowed period subject to a defeasance limited to
take effect beyond that period, which, being void, would render
the fees indefeasible. But the court held that not only the dis-
24. As to the doctrine that no estate can be given to the unborn child of
an unborn child, see Whitby v. Mitchell, 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890). The doctrine
was limited in Greenleaf v. Greenleaf, 332 Mo. 402, 58 S.W.2d 448 (1933),
and it is doubtful whether it has any effect in Missouri.
25. See Hudson, supra note 1, at 23-26, for an analysis of the cases relied
upon by the court as sustaining the test.
26. 206 Mo. 208, 103 S.W. 989 (1907).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/1
VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES - 307
position of the particular property, but also all other provisions
of the will, including devises in fee, were void because all of the
provisions were part of a "general plan of the testator." Ironi-
cally, the opinion of the court in Shepperd v. Fisher contained
one of the clearest and most succinct restatements of the general
rule of separability:
The books are full of cases which hold that when the will
contains distinct and independent provisions so that different
portions of the property or different est'ates in the same are
created, some of which are valid and others of them invalid,
the valid ones will be preserved unless those which are valid
are so dependent upon the invalid that they cannot be sepa-
rated without defeating the general intention of the testator2
Riley v. Jaeger s involved a will in which the testatrix left all
of her property to her eight children in equal shares, but annexed
a further provision that in the event of the death of any one of
the eight children without issue, or in case the direct descendants
of any one of the children should all die, then the share of such
child should "revert to the survivor of the eight direct legatees
named and to the descendants of such as may be deceased." Inter-
preting the latter provision as one intended to take effect upon
indefinite failure of issue, the circuit court had held the will void
for conflict with the rule against perpetuities. The Supreme
Court, after holding that the devise over was clearly violative of
the rule against perpetuities, proceeded to affirm the judgment
without any discussion of the effect of the invalid limitation over
upon the balance of the will. This failure to consider the point
might have implied that total intestacy was the necessary result
of partial invalidity, or it may have meant no more than that the
court deemed it unnecessary to consider the point, since the prop-
erty would go to the eight children in any event, i.e., either if the
limitations divesting their interests alone were invalid, or if the
result of such invalidity was total intestacy.
Concerning the Missouri cases cited above, the Fourth Edition
of Gray's The Rule Against Perpetuities29. made the following
comment:
In some of these cases, the language of the CQou suggested
that the Missouri doctrine was based upon a pres".mption of
27. Id. at 245, 103 S.W. at 999.
28. 189 S.W. 1168 (Mo. 1916).
29. § 249, p.-262.
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intent that all of the provisions of the trust should stand or
fall together. But in all the cases the doctrine has been ap-
plied in such a sweeping manner, without any apparent con-
sideration of what the testator would have wished in the
particular case, that the presumption, if so it is called, seems
to amount to a positive rule of law.
After Riley v. Jaeger came two cases bearing upon the effect
of violation of the rule against perpetuities which held forth some
promise of conformity with traditional concepts.
Deacon v. St. Louis Union Trust Company,3- invo!ving tle will
of Lily Lambert, laid what might have been the foundation for a
decision conforming with the majority rule with respect to fee-
executory devise situations. Mrs. Lambert left her property,
including a controlling interest in Lambert Pharmacal Company,
in trust for a period of thirty years upon the termination of
whicl; division of the property was to be made among her six
children. A 'subsequent clause of the will provided that if a child
died before final, distribution of the trust the issue of the child
should take all the rights of the parent, or if the child left no
issue his or her share should pass to the survivors of textatrix'
children or their issue. The court construed the will as creating
iri the children interests which became immediately vested sub-
ject to being divested in the case of a child who died within the
thirty year period. Further determining that the executory de-
vise in favor of the issue of a child or in favor of the surviving
children or their issue would necessarily take effect upon the
death of the child as unqualified fees (i.e., not subject to succes-
sive defeasances), it held that there was no violation of the rule
against perpetuities. Note that the key to the result here was the
treatment of the interests of children and issue of children as
becoming vested within the allowed period, although possession
was postponed for a period of thirty years. From such a holding
it would not have been too difficult to reach the further holding,
in an appropriate case, that the creation of vested interests in
fee satisfied the requirements of the rule against perpetuities,
even though they were defeasible upon a condition which might
occur beyond the allowed period; with the result that the execu-
tory devises limited upon the void condition would fail and the
vested interests would be indefeasible.
30. 271 Mo. 669, 197 S.W. 261 (1917).
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The appropriate case soon arose, but a different rationale was
employed in its solution.
In Schee v. Boone,32 the testator by his will left 811 acres of
land to his daughter "and to the heirs of her body at her death."
This limitation, which at common law would have created an
estate tail, operated under the statute abolishing estates tail to
create a life estate in the first taker with remainder in fee to
those to whom the estate would have passed upon the death of
the first taker according to the course of the common law. A
subsequent limitation provided, however, that if any of the bodily
heirs of the daughter should die without issue after the death of
their mother, the surviving spouse of such heir should have no
interest in the property, but the share of such heir should vest
"in his brothers and sisters who may be living, or who may have
died leaving issue." The court upheld the disposition, as against
the contention that it violated the rule against perpetuities, on
the ground that the limitation over upon the death of a bodily
heir after the death of the life tenant, and after such bodily heir
had taken the fee, was inconsistent with the prior estate, "the
creation of which was the paramount purpose of the testator,"
and should, therefore, be rejected for repugnancy. In result,
although not in reasoning, this case was in line with the holdings
in other states respecting the effect of a remote executory devise
upon a previously limited fee.
In Loud v. St. Louis Union Trust Company2 a testatrix dis-
posed of her residuary estate in trust for the following purposes:
to pay stipulated amounts of income to her daughter for life;
after the death of the daughter to hold the trust estate for the
equal benefit of testatrix' grandchildren with power to apply
income for their benefit during minority and to make allowances
to them after attainment of majority; and to distribute to each
grandchild one-half of his or her share of the principal upon
attainment of the age of thirty-five years and the balance thereof
upon attainment of the age of forty years. If a grandchild were
to die before receiving all of his or her share, the share was to
be held for the grandchild's issue until attainment of the age of
twenty-one years, or in default of issue was to be divided per
stirpes among the other surviving grandchildren and the issue of
31. 295 Mo. 212, 243 S.W. 882 (1922).
32. 298 Mo. 148, 249 S.W. 629 (1923).
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deceased grandchildren, subject to the same conditions as affected
their original shares. The court held that, since the testatrix'
daughter might have children born after testatrix' death, the
limitations in favor of their issue were such as would not neces-
sarily take effect within the prescribed period. Without, upon
this occasion, referring to the rules respecting separability of
prior estates, the court proceeded directly to the conclusion that
the entire will was void. The postulate of the decision again
appears to have been that the will provided for "but one dis-
position of the property."
In Mockbee v. Grooms 3 the court had before it a complicated
will, in which a testatrix made a series of devises of specific lands.
Three such devises in favor of members of testatrix' family were
affected by like ultimate limitations. One such devise, which will
serve as an example, was to a daughter for life and was followed
by directions that at the daughter's death the land should be sold
and the proceeds deposited with a named trust company, there
to remain and to draw interest until the youngest child of the
daughter should attain the age of twenty-five years, whereupon
the proceeds, with accrued interest, were to be divided among
the daughter's then living children, descendants of a deceased
child to take in place of their father or mother. In the event of
the death of all of the daughter's children before the youngest
should attain the age of twenty-five years, the proceeds were to
become the property of the children of another daughter of the
testatrix subject to like provisions for retention and ultimate
distribution, and in the event that all of the grandchildren of the
testatrix should die before attaining the age of twenty-five years,
the proceeds were to be paid to charity. The court held that the
three interrelated property dispositions were wholly void. But
in sustaining devises of other property contained in the same
will, the court, after reviewing Shepperd v. Fisher and other
Missouri cases, said:
From the above quotations, it is clear that the doctrine of
this court is, that before we can hold void other devises in a
will because certain devises are void as violating the rule
against perpetuities, such other devises must be in some man-
ner connected with the void provisions, or be dependent upon
them, or the court must be convinced that the whole will was
made pursuant to one general plan of disposition, and that
33. 300 Mo. 446, 254 S.W. 170 (1923).
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the valid devises would not have been made by the testator
without his intention that the invalid part should also take
effect in manner and form as in his will provided.3'
Mockbee v. Grooms was followed by a series of cases 35 in which
the court adopted liberal constructions of property dispositions
which avoided application of the rule against perpetuities. As if
to shield such dispositions from its rigid precedents as to the
effect of violation of the rule, the court during this period softehied
the impact of the rule by announcing and applying the principle
that where an instrument is susceptible of two possible inter-
pretations, one of which would result in the instrument's being
rendered void, and the other of which would result in sustention
of the instrument, that construction should be adopted which
would uphold the instrument."
One of these cases is, however, of significance upon the ques-
tion of the effect of violation of the rule, namely Davis v. Rossi.
There the court had before it a deed creating a trust, one of the
provisioi s of which directed that certain income be distributed
to the grantor's ten children (namdd in the deed) and that upon
the death of a child during the trust period such child's share of
the income be distributed to his or her descendants, or in default
of descendants, as to one-half thereof, to his or her widow or
widower for life, and another provision of which directed termi-
nation of the trust at the death of the last survivor of the
grantor's wife and children. Since the wife (or husband) of a
child of the grantor might be a person who was not alive at the
time of the creation of the trust, the provision for the payment
of income to the widow (or widower) of a child would, standing
by itself, have suspended the vesting beyond the allowed period.
The court, following the rationale of Schee v. Boone, rejected for
repugnancy so much of the grant of income to the widow (or
,.vidower) of a child as required payment of such income beyond
the period otherwise prescribed for the termination of the trust.
34. Id. at 472, 254 S.W. at 176.
35. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932) ; Niedringhaus v.
Williams F. Niedringhaus Investment Co., 329 Mo. 84, 46 S.W.2d 828(1931); Davis v. Rossi, 326 Mo. 911, 34 S.W.2d 8 (1930); .Plummer v.
Roberts, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926).
36. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932); Davis v. Rossi,
326 Mo. 911, 34 S.W.2d 8 (1930); Plummer v. Robert, 315 Mo. 627, 287
S.W. 316 (1926). See also Carter v. Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629,
92 S.W.2d 647 (1936).
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In effect, this was a sustention of the valid provisions of the deed
through the partial extinguishment of an offending interest.
St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Bassett3' was a reversion
to the line of decision exemplified by Riley v. Jaeger, Loud v. St.
Louis Union Trust Company and Mockbee v. Grooms. The Bassett
case involved a will by the residuary clause of which trusts were
created for the benefit of certain named beneficiaries (including
a nephew and nieces of the testatrix) to continue until they
should respectively attain the age of forty years, subject to a
provision (among others) that if any beneficiary should die be-
fore becoming entitled to distribution, leaving descendants, the
share of the one so dying should be held for the benefit of such
descendants until the youngest of the beneficiaries named in the
will should attain the age of forty years. The word "beneficiaries"
was construed (by reference to the language of a spendthrift
provision) to mean not only the original named beneficiaries but
also children (including unborn children) of the latter, and the
interests of all such beneficiaries were treated as remaining con-
tingent until the youngest of the original named beneficiaries
attained, or would, if he or she survived, have attained, the age
of forty years. Under such construction, there was a possibility
that all of the original named beneficiaries might die shortly after
the death of the testatrix and that a child of one of them, born
after the death of testatrix, might have to wait more than twenty-
one years after the death of the last to survive the named bene-
ficiaries before title would vest in him or her. After holding that
ultimate vesting was too long postponed, the court said:
It is our conclusion that the residuary clause, under the facts
pleaded, violates the rule and that as to the individual estate
of the testatrix the residuary clause is void. 5
Reference was made in the opinion to an issue raised in the
briefs as to whether the disposition, if violative of the rule against
perpetuities, was void in part or in toto, but the principles of
separability were not further discussed 9
37. 337 Mo. 604, 85 S.W.2d 569 (1935).
38. Id. at 623, 85 S.W.2d at 579.
39. The case is frequently cited upon a secondary point, arising out of an
exercise in the Will of a power of appointment, to the effect that upon
exercise of a power other than a general power to appoint by deed or will
the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities is reckoned from the
date of the creation of the power.
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St. Louis Union Trust Company v. Kelley40 illustrates the same
tendency to treat any void limitation as contaminating the entire
property disposition of which it is part, without precedent judicial
determination as to what might have been the testator's prefer-
ence had he known that such limitation was void. The situation
presented was this: Testatrix left her residuary estate in trust
for the benefit in equal shares of her two daughters for their
respective lives. Upon the death of a daughter leaving children
or descendants of children her surviving, the trustees were di-
rected to convey and transfer the "fee simple title" of such daugh-
ter's share to such children or descendants of children, share and
share alike, the descendants of any deceased child taking the
share that their parent would have taken if living, provided "that
he or she shall have attained the age of thirty years." If the
child (or descendant) should not have attained that age, his or
her share was to be distributed to him or her in two installments
at age t-wenty-five and age thirty, respectively, and if he or she
should die before receiving complete distribution of the share,
the undistributed portion of the share was to go to his or her
heirs "on the maternal side." There was express language to the
effect that the fee simple title should vest only at the times and
to the extent prescribed. The court held that since it was not
certain that all of the remainders in testatrix' grandchildren or
their descendants would vest within a life or lives in being at
testatrix' death and tventy-one years thereafter, there was a
violation of the rule against perpetuities and the entire trust was
void.
The opinion of the court in the Kelley case was remarkable
for its almost complete avoidance of discussion of the issues upon
which the case was primarily presented as to the effect of the
ulterior limitation which it held void upon the prior limitations.
It did, indeed, touch upon a contention of the proponents of the
trust that the void limitation was an executory devise and its
voidity had the effect of rendering previously limited fees inde-
feasible, by saying:
Another rule, more of law than construction, is that where
a deed or will vests a fee simple title in remainder upon the
termination of a preceding life estate, and within the time
allowed by the rule against perpetuities, the title is good not-
40. 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344 (1947).
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withstanding the instrument by a condition subsequent an-
nexes a limitation whereby the fee may possibly be divested.
For the rule against perpetuities is concerned with when the
vested estate begins, not when it ends. [Citing Schee v.
Boone as upholding the proposition.] 41
But the court did not undertake to construe the trust from the
standpoint of the nature of the interests created by the various
limitations. Nor did it embark upon a judicial determination
whether testatrix, had she known of the invalidity of the ulterior
limitation, would have preferred that the balance of the trust
provisions should take effect or that they should fail. It proceeded
directly from a determination that the rule against perpetuities
had been violated to an affirmance of a decree that had held the
entire residuary trust to be void.
The view that under the Missouri decisions the presence of a
single void limitation in a deed or will results in total invalidity
of the property disposition derives substantial support from a
line of cases in which the court proceeded from a determination
that the rule against perpetuities had been violated directly to a
holding that the entire disposition was void, without any discus-
sion of the effect of the void limitation upon the balance of the
disposition and without any apparent recognition that an issue
concerning such effect existed. The prophets of total voidity may
well argue that, in our jurisprudence, that which the court did
is more expressive of the law than what it said. The mere fact
that in such cases as Lockridge v. Mace and Loud v. St. Louis
Union Trust Company the valid, as well as the invalid, portions
of the disposition were held to fall together, because they con-
stituted parts of a single plan of disposition, would scarcely re-
fute the conclusion that in Missouri partial invalidity results in
total invalidity. Such a test is so vague and uncertain that it
taxes one's imagination as to what kind of a void limitation
would be so separable from the "general plan of disposition" as
not to invalidate the balance of the disposition.
Yet the state of the law is incongruous. The court has not only
refrained from making an express pronouncement that one void
limitation in a deed or will renders the whole disposition void,
but has from time to time uttered dicta expressing its assumed
41. Id. at 934, 199 S.W.2d at 350.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/1
VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 315
adherence to the general law in other jurisdictions. Even in such
a case as Shepperd v. Fisher, which in result suggests that partial
invalidity produces total invalidity, the court stated the general
principles as to separability or inseparability of prior valid
limitations from a void ulterior limitation in consonance with the
assumed preference of the testator, and it purported to render
its decision consistently with those principles.
This much, however, must be conceded: the court has never in
any case made a judicial determination, in conformity with the
principle of Section 402 of the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Law of Property, with respect to the testator's pref-
erence as to the effect of a void ultimate limitation upon prior
limitations, if he had known of the invalidity of the ulterior lim-
itation; and, except possibly in Schee v. Boone and Davis v. Rossi,
it has never upheld a prior valid limitation where the ulterior
limitation was held void.
The Missouri Supreme Court has been most zealous in its pro-
nouncements, even in perpetuities cases, that in the construction
of a will the intention of the testator as gathered from the four
corners of the will is controlling.42 Since no more eloquent testi-
mony of an intent not to die intestate is conceivable than that
embodied in the solemn act of making a will, it would be reason-
able to expect that the principle that testamentary intent is con-
trolling should be given application also in relation to the effect
of partial invalidity. Yet the court has, in a number of cases,
decreed total invalidity whenever a property disposition con-
tained a limitation which overstepped the period allowed by the
rule against perpetuities, without attempting by construction to
ascertain what, under the circumstances, might have been the
conveyor's preference. Granting that cases may arise in which
there is so close a connection between the invalid limitation form-
ing part of the disposition and the balance of the disposition
that it can be fairly determined that, had the conveyor known of
the partial invalidity, he would have preferred that the entire
disposition fail, the court has never seen fit to make a judicial
ascertainment of testamentary preference.
Only two conclusions concerning the law of Missouri on the
42. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W.2d 135 (1932); Plummer v.
Roberts, 315 Mo. 627, 287 S.W. 316 (1926); Schee v. Boone, 295 Mo. 212,
243 S.W. 882 (1922).
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effect of partial invalidity are possible: the first, that one void
limitation in a deed or will destroys the entire property disposi-
tion of which it is a part; the second, that the Missouri Supreme
Court, although it has dealt severely in a number of cases with
property dispositions affected by void limitations, has never
closed the door completely on the doctrine that the conveyor's
preference, had he known of the voidity, should be given effect,
and would in the proper kind of a case apply that doctrine.
Whichever of these conclusions be correct, the need of remedial
legislation is clearly suggested.
The view of complete voidity implies that if a conveyor trans-
gresses the rule against perpetuities in the slightest degree, his
entire property disposition is void and whatever might under the
circumstances have been his preference is immaterial. As applied
to a case where it could reasonably be inferred that, had the con-
veyor known of the partial invalidity, he would have preferred
that the balance of the disposition, or portions thereof, should
stand, such an application of the rule against perpetuities is penal
-it punishes the conveyor because of his transgression, and the
intended objects of his bounty because of no sin whatsoever, by
vesting the property in a manner contrary to the conveyor's in-
tention. The punishment simply does not fit the crime, and par-
ticularly is this so where the transgression, as in most cases, is
the result of inadvertence. Nor does the concept of total in-
validity conform with the historical function of the rule against
perpetuities. Even in Georgian England when conveyors were
still endeavoring to perpetuate family importance by the creation
of successive limited interests in property, the rule was applied
as a bar and not as a penalty. Surely in the milder social climate
of present day Missouri, the establishment of penal sanctions for
the rule against perpetuities has no place.
The view that the law of Missouri as to the effect of partial
invalidity is still unsettled-that the Missouri court waits, with
appropriate dicta from its prior decisions, the appearance of a
proper kind of case in which to apply the test of conveyor's
preference-is scarcely an encouraging view. Thirty-seven years
have transpired since Professor Hudson protested against the
trend of the decisions in Lockridge v. Mace and Shepperd v.
Fisher. Since then only about twenty cases involving the rule
against perpetuities have been presented, without producing the
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kind of case in which the court was impelled to give full and ade-
quate consideration to the effect of a void limitation upon valid
limitations forming part of the same property disposition. The
better hope of settlement of the law, if that is what is needed,
would seem to lie in remedial legislation, rather than in the ap-
pearance of the proper kind of case.
A SUGGESTION FOR STATUTORY RELIEF
In the present state of the law concerning the effect of violation
of the rule against perpetuities, Missouri stands isolated, and it
is earnestly submitted that consideration should be given by the
Missouri Bar to the proposal of legislation which would either
bring the state law into conformity with that prevailing else-
where, or otherwise relieve against the penalty for violation
which the current of decisions either imposes or leaves to be
inferred.
At first glance, it would seem that such remedial legislation
might take the form of adopting the principle of Section 402 of
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Prop-
erty. This, however, does not seem. feasible. The Restatement
was never intended as a codification. Section 402 is, moreover,
not self-implementing. It states broadly that the effect of partial
invalidity is to be determined by judicially ascertaining whether
the conveyor, if he had known of the partial invalidity, would
have preferred that all of the balance of the attempted disposi-
tion take effect, or that parts of such balance fail, or that all of
it fail; but the application of the principle is dependent upon
rules of constructional preference which are to be derived not
only from the comments under Section 402 but also from related
sections. To enact Section 402 alone would do no more than re-
express some of the dicta of the Missouri Supreme Court. To
embody the rules of constructional preference would involve an
Herculean task of codification of portions of the Law of Property.
A somewhat simpler approach would seem to lie in adopting
the principle of cutting down by statutory fiat the limitations of
a deed or will which result in violation of the rule against per-
petuities, so that the conveyor's expressed intent may be effec-
tuated to the extent, but only to the extent, that it does not trans-
gress the rule.
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In England this principle was adopted in Section 163 of the
Law of Property Act of 192543 to further ameliorate the harsh
effect of violation of the rule in certain types of cases. That
statute reads as follows:
163.-(1) Where in a will, settlement or other instrument
the absolute vesting either of capital or income of property,
or the ascertainment of a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries,
is made to depend on the attainment by the beneficiary or
members of the class of an age exceeding twenty-one years,
and thereby the gift to that beneficiary or class or any mem-
ber thereof, or any gift over, remainder, executory limita-
tion, or trust arising on the total or partial failure of the
original gift, is, or but for this section would be, rendered
void for remoteness, the will, settlement, or other instrument
shall take effect for the purposes of such gift, gift over, re-
mainder, executory limitation, or trust as if the absolute
vesting or ascertainment aforesaid had been made to depend
on the beneficiary or member of the class attaining the age
of twenty-one years, and that age shall be substituted for the
age stated in the will, settlement, or other instrument.
(2) This section applies to any instrument executed after
the commencment of this Act and to any testamentary ap-
pointment (whether made in the exercise of a general or
special power), devise, or bequest contained in the will of a
person dying after such commencement, whether the will is
made before or after such commencement.
(3) This section applies without prejudice to any pro-
vision whereby the absolute vesting or ascertainment is also
made to depend on the marriage of any person, or any other
event which may occur before the age stated in the will,
settlement, or other instrument is attained.
Obviously, such a statute would fall short of affording the
relief which is needed in Missouri. It presupposes a judicial
climate, such as has prevailed in England from the inception of
the rule against perpetuities, in which void ulterior limitations
were held not to affect valid prior limitations unless it otherwise
appeared that the conveyor would have preferred the valid to
fall with the void. The statute corrected merely the inequity
which arose from the adoption by the conveyor of age require-
ments which resulted or might result in too long a suspension of
vesting. -
But the statute is a clear precedent for legislation which would
overcome the* strict application of the doctrine of contamination
43. Law of Property Act; 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 163.
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of the valid by the invalid, by simply cutting down the provisions
of the instrument to permissible limits.
This principle, applied with broader scope, is inherent in the
perpetuities savings clauses which are widely employed in the
drafting of deeds and wills creating trust estates. Where a drafts-
man is conscious of a limitation contained in the instrument
which may possibly not take effect within the allowed period, or
where he is simply imbued with the idea of superabundant pre-
caution, it is not uncommon for him to insert in the instrument
a clause to the effect that, notwithstanding any provision therein
contained to the contrary, each trust thereby created which is still
in existence at the termination of a period of twenty-one years
after the death of the last to survive of certain designated per-
sons (who are living at the effective date of the instrument)
shall forthwith end, and any trust property which shall not there-
tofore have been distributed pursuant to other provisions of the
instrument shall upon the termination of such twenty-one year
period be forthwith distributed to the persons, and in the pro-
portions in which such persons, are then entitled to the income or
the benefit of the income of such remaining trust property. Such
savings clauses have generally been held effective to avoid appli-
cation of the rule against perpetuities." In professional experi-
ence, one rarely encounters an objection on the part of a con-
veyor to the insertion thereof in the deed or will.
The enactment of a statute in Missouri, wlich would embody
the principle of the perpetuities savings clauses, would seem to
be precisely the remedy which is needed to overcome the harsh
results of decisions which have thus far failed to apply the prin-
ciples elsewhere adhered to that the effect of partial invalidity
on the balance of the property disposition is to be determined
by judicially ascertaining the conveyor's preference. Such a
statute would in effect provide that: where in a deed or will the
vesting of any property is or may be postponed beyond a period
of twenty-one years (plus actual periods of gestation) after the
death of the last to survive of all persons who (a) are or were in
being at the effective date of the instrument, and (b) either
became entitled under the instrument to some legal or equitable
44. Friday's Estate, 313 Pa. 328, 170 Ati. 123 (1933) ; Boston Safe De-
posit & Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390, 111 N.E. 163 (1916); Note,
91 A.L.R. 771 (1934).
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interest, vested or contingent, in such property, or were named
in the instrument-no interest created by the instrument which
is limited to vest prior to the termination of said period of twenty-
one years shall fail by reason of the rule against perpetuities,
and, if at the termination of said period of twenty-one years such
property or any interest therein shall not become vested pursuant
to the terms of the instrument, it shall immediately after such
termination become vested in the persons, and in the proportions
in which such persons, are then entitled to the income from such
property or interest therein. The "effective date of the instru-
ment" might be defined as the date of its delivery in the case of
an irrevocable transfer inter vivos and as the date of the death
of the testator or grantor in the case of a will or revocable trans-
fer inter vivos. In order to avoid constitutional questions the
statute would, advisedly, be made applicable only to instruments
becoming effective after the enactment of the statute.
The following considerations are offered in favor of such a
statute:
1. It would in no way lessen the restrictions imposed by the
rule against perpetuities or impair the force of the public policy
which it embodies. The rule which forbids the suspension of
vesting for a period longer than that measured by lives in being,
plus twenty-one years plus any period of actual gestation, by the
same token sanctions a suspension which is no longer than that
period, even though it extends to its utmost limit.45 Since the
effeut of the proposed statute, where operative, would be merely
that of accelerating the vesting to a point of time legally per-
missible for a voluntary conveyance, it could not be said to be
socially objectionable, unless the objection be on the ground that
an attempted transgression should be punished. Such a motive
would be completely foreign to the public policy which produced
the rule.
2. The proposed statute would in no way affect the provisions
of any deed or will which contains no violation of the rule against
perpetuities in its present form. It would operate solely upon
45. An extreme example of permitted suspension may be found in Villar,
Public Trustee v. Villar, (1929) 1 Ch. 243, where a testator created a trust
to continue until the termination of a twenty year period after the death
of the last to survive of the descendants of Queen Victoria who were living
at the time of the testator's death.
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property dispositions which contain void limitations, ie. those
whose validity is now in question.
3. Where, in the case of a deed or will, violation of the rule
against perpetuities is postulated upon a mere possibility of
postponement of vesting beyond the allowed period, which does
not in fact transpire, the proposed statute would produce no
modification of the provisions of the deed or will and the con-
veyor's intent therein expressed would be completely effectuated.
This result implies, to be sure, the supersession of the principle
that violation of the rule is to be tested by the possibility under
the instrument, rather than by the actuality, of remote vesting.
However, that principle was never socially necessary, but only
administratively necessary because the court could not at the
time when it was called upon to act foretell whether a future
contingency would or would not occur-a forecast which the
proposed statute would not require. The principle, moreover,
often produces harsh results. In a number of the Missouri cases
cited above, for example, violation of the rule against perpetuities
resulted from the existence of a possibility that a female life
tenant of advanced age might have children who were unborn at
the effective date of the instrument and that the interests of such
unborn children would postpone ultimate vesting for too long a
period, when in fact no such children were subsequently born and
indeed the legal possibility was a scientific improbability. A
similar harsh result would ensue from the creation of a life
estate for a child's widow (who might possibly be a person un-
born at the effective date of the instrument) and an attempted
limitation over upon the death of such widow, when in fact the
child is already married at the effective date of the instrument
and the possibility of the unborn future wife is an Hogarthian
concept. In such cases, the proposed statute would substitute
complete effectuation of the conveyor's intent (without actual
violation of the rule against perpetuities) in the place of complete
or partial destruction of the conveyor's intent.
4. Where a deed or will contains a void limitation to take effect
upon a contingency which does in fact occur, the proposed statute
would produce a modification of the provisions of the deed or will
by requiring a vesting of the property in the persons who at the
termination of the allowed period are currently entitled to the
income. But from the standpoint of affecting property rights,
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the question in such a case is whether less violence to the con-
veyor's intent would be done by such an ultimate vesting under
the provisions of the statute, or by the application of the rule
(considered by many to exist in Missouri) which would com-
pletely disregard the conveyor's expressed intent and would in-
validate the entire property disposition. The statute would seem
to be the instrument of lesser violence. The interests limited by
the instrument to vest within the allowed period would under the
statute be given full effect, and only twenty-one years after all
beneficiaries living at the effective date of the instrument had
passed out of existence, if at all, would the substitutionary pro-
visions of the statute take effect. In view of the fact that such
substitutionary provisions would require the vesting at the termi-
nation of the allowed period of all previously unvested property
in persons on whom the conveyor conferred the enjoyment, it
cannot be said that great violence is done to his intention. He
has merely been restrained from providing for a change in the
enjoyment beyond the allowed period.
5. The proposed statute, by producing a certainty of vesting
within the allowed period, would tend to reduce ligitation. Al-
though the provisions of a deed or will, if of uncertain meaning,
would be open to construction by a court, issues based upon the
effect of limitations void for remoteness would be eliminated.
The removal of the overhanging threat of litigation concerning
the validity of a property disposition by reason of the rule against
perpetuities would not only be of advantage to the beneficiaries
of the disposition, but, where a trust has been created, would
constitute an assurance to the trustee of his right to carry out
the provisions of the trust according to its terms. As it now
stands, the liability of a trustee who acts under an instrument of
doubtful validity is not clearly defined,"6 and this in itself con-
stitutes an inducement to litigation, although none is otherwise
contemplated.
6. The statute would restore the rule against perpetuities to its
historical function as a bar against the creation of interests
limited to take effect after the termination of the allowed period.
This proposal is submitted with the hope that it will contribute
46. Cf. Schuyler, Payments under Void Tnusts, 65 HARV. L. REv. 597
(1952).
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to the study of a problem with respect to which Missouri stands
in a unique position. The law of Missouri ought not to persist in
its present state.1
47. After the foregoing article was prepared, two articles on perpetuities
by Professor W. Barton Leach were published. Perpetuities: Stayinp the
Slaughter of the Innocent, 68 L. Q. R v. 35 (1952); and Perpetuities in
Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. 1. R V. 7/21
(1952). These articles, although not touching specifically upon the unique
situation in Missouri, deal with the unrealistic and superfluous technicalities
of the rule against perpetuities and suggest the need for the development
of a more rational case law or correctives by legislation. They are most
valuable contributions to any study directed to a reshaping of the rule.
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